
































































Do corporate headquarters play a role in mandatory versus voluntary financials
distress driven trading suspensions?
Konstantaras, Konstantinos
Published in:
Journal of Financial Decision Making
Publication date:
2011
Link to publication in Heriot-Watt Research Gateway
Citation for published version (APA):
Konstantaras, K. (2011). Do corporate headquarters play a role in mandatory versus voluntary financials distress
driven trading suspensions?. Journal of Financial Decision Making, 7(1).JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING 
Volume 7, Number 1, June 2011 
Do Corporate Headquarters Play a Role in Mandatory Versus 
Voluntary Financial Distress Driven Trading Suspensions? 
Konstantinos Konstantaras 
University of Patras, email: dinokon@otenet.gr 
ABSTRACT 
Motivated by previous researchers’ conclusion that management of financially distressed firms extends considerable 
efforts to avoid exchange delisting and trading suspension, we formulate a methodology to incorporate managerial ef-
forts and corporate characteristics driving exchange decisions. Employing an ordinal logit model with random unob-
served heterogeneity, we confirm that there exists an implicit managerial influence on exchange rulings; analyzing a 
panel of financially distressed firms listed on the Athens stock exchange we establish that management of financially 
distressed firms’ acts in a synergistic to shareholders fashion, preferring corporate restructuring (voluntary suspen-
sions) to staying inactive and the latter to mandatory (involuntary) suspensions. Furthermore, we find that size, fixed 
and total asset growth, asset intensity and persistence of financial distress, coupled with the macroeconomic environ-
ment, significantly affect its eventual stock exchange route. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on stock exchange trade disrupting decisions resulting from corporate Financial Distress 
(FD), classifying them under voluntary and mandatory suspensions. Mandatory trading suspensions are often 
imposed to a listed FD company because of exchange authority’s fears of FD-related severe financial short-
comings and may last for days or years. In contrast, firms initiate a voluntary suspension, commonly lasting 
for minutes or day(s), in order to disseminate to market participants Merger and Acquisition (M&A) or other 
corporate restructuring information in their attempts to counter FD. Other causes of voluntary suspensions 
such as trade imbalances and specialist demands for trading halts will not be considered in this study, as they 
encompass a wider range of occasions than are our main focus which is on FD outcomes. 
Although trading suspensions and their efficacy in transmitting information and price discovery has 
been a subject extensively scrutinized by international researchers (Howe & Schlarbaum 1986; Ferris et al 
1992; Wu 1998; Engelen & Kabir 2006), it has been largely treated as exogenous to the firm. Nevertheless, 
both voluntary and mandatory suspensions represent milestones signifying the evolution of FD. The latter 
bear significantly negative ramifications to company’s stakeholders (Wu 1998; Engelen & Kabir 2006) and 
are a consequence of an increased probability (according to regulators) of bankruptcy or other sort of ex-
traordinarily adverse FD complication. Involuntary trading suspension and delistings’ undesirable effects on 
management and shareholders have been substantially evidenced (Macey et al., 2008). Moreover, the fact 
that considerable efforts are consumed from company’s management to avoid suspension, as has been evi-80 Konstantinos  Konstantaras 
denced in NASDAQ (Frost et al., 2009) and Chinese Stock Exchange (Jiang & Wang 2008;Cheng et al., 
2010), leads us to hypothesize that they have an influential role to play in rendering stock exchange “manda-
tory” suspensions more or less probable to occur. Hence, the conflict of interest between FD company man-
agement, shareholders and creditors with respect to the more beneficial course of action may be directly 
extended to the choices between restructuring (generating a voluntary trading suspension) and bankruptcy 
(causing a mandatory suspension). 
In order to test whether existing research, treating the stock exchange suspensions as entirely exogenous 
to the firm, is a more valid approach than the one we propose, we hypothesize that, under our modeling 
framework, management should portray a preference of voluntary halts over mandatory suspensions; assum-
ing managerial interests are aligned with its shareholders, the price reduction of a trading suspension should 
be the least desirable outcome of FD. On the other hand, stock exchange authorities should be indifferent be-
tween alternative trading disruptions to be imposed in member firms because a) the price impact of a trade 
suspension leaves exchange authorities unaffected (unless it’s their own listed stock), and b) preserving the 
reputation of an exchange (Macey et al., 2008) would counter the loss of income from a delisted firm, not-
withstanding it would normally take several periods of suspension before a stock disappears from the ex-
change.  
The more the company approaches towards bankruptcy its creditors would rather have all company’s as-
sets preserved whereas stockholders might prefer, especially in the cases of an extremely low expected reor-
ganization value, the firm to “roll the dice” as they have little to lose. Managerial incentives should have a 
role to play, aligning their interests with shareholders, creditors or their own. We check whether preference of 
FD outcomes is driven by non-synergistic (Jensen, 1986) or synergistic (Jensen, 1993) motivations. For this 
purpose, we formulate an ordered logit model to test which pecking order of our dependent variable fits our 
data better (a synergistic or not). Given that the majority of companies in our sample are family or manager 
owned, our findings should confirm the synergistic supposition. 
Vis a vis the dichotomy between expected shareholder returns under a FD corporate restructuring reso-
lution (Theodossiou et al., 1996) and FD-related fears for a forthcoming bankruptcy (Ferris et al., 1992), our 
categorization makes even more economic sense; restructuring announcements via trading halts would be 
expected to signal shareholder benefits, whereas decisions to set company’s shares under mid to long term 
suspension for FD-related reasons would signal the opposite. Our differentiation from the extensive previous 
research on FD alternative outcomes (John et al., 1992; Howe & Schlarbaum, 1986; Gertner & Scharfstein, 
1996; Franks & Sussman, 2005) relies on our analysis of the official stock exchange announcements. We ex-
pand the typically analyzed universe of bankrupt firms with those that, according to the official stock ex-
change rulings, are highly probable to get bankrupt. Hence, we may exploit the, mostly in advance, signal 
expressed by the official stock exchange’s view for severe FD problems, which in most cases sums up the 
investor community’s and stock exchange authorities’ verdict on whether significant financial trouble exists 
(Bradley 1996).  
Stock exchange trading suspension decisions, apart from signaling a potential forthcoming financial dif-
ficulty, bear an important and simultaneous effect on investors and corporate credit standing because of their 
negative stock performance implications. Trading suspension not only affects company’s shareholders and its 
managers, to the degree they participate in the stock’s upside potential, but also bankers, especially those that 
have extended loans collateralized by shares. Loss Given Default (LGD), in the spirit of Basle II guidelines, 
for outstanding stock-collateralized loans may be significantly magnified under a trading suspension deci-
sion: Jokivuolle & Peura (2003) have shown that lending against stock collateral may increase sevenfold the 
expected LGD, rendering trading suspension’s ramifications deleterious for practicing institutions. Insofar as 
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mandatory trading suspensions bear a negative share price impact, the overall firm credit standing should be 
affected, because of the implied reduction of the distance of company’s asset valuation from its debt’s nomi-
nal value, referred to in option theoretical credit formulation as “distance to default” (Merton 1974). Under 
those circumstances, our overall goal to estimate the probability of stock exchange’s supervision decisions 
could be instrumental in estimating probability of default and economic-downturn LGD internationally, as 
per Basel II convention’s guidelines. According to Basel Committee’s regulations (BCBS, 2005), advanced 
Internal Ratings Based banks are required to estimate their own downturn LGDs that, where necessary, re-
flect the tendency for LGDs during economic downturn conditions to exceed those that arise during typical 
business conditions. Hence, our attempt to predict the official stock exchange  supervision/suspension/
delisting rulings assumes increased importance for the investor and creditor communities.  
Appreciating the fact that banks may hold on to considerable stock collateral positions stemming from 
loans to major shareholders or margin loans, our analysis implicitly considers the direct impact of stock ex-
change’s decisions to their value. Such a case has e.g. arisen in the U.S. in the case of the WorldCom scandal 
and the infamous $400 million loan to its CEO Bernnie Ebbers pledged by WorldCom shares, which eventu-
ally suffered a trading suspension by NASDAQ (Fanto, 2004). Additionally, the practice of lending against 
stock and margin loans is well established internationally, by banks and their stockbrokerage subsidiaries in 
mainstream (Jostarndt & Sautner, 2008) and emerging markets (Endo & Rhee, 2006). 
The typical theoretical underpinning analyzed in equivalent studies of FD is to explore the driving force 
behind the conflicts of interest between restructuring and bankruptcy tradeoff (Gertner & Scharfstein, 1991; 
Franks & Sussman 2005). In line with Dahiya and Klapper (2007), our restructuring categorization, in addi-
tion to the commonly scrutinized M&A announcements, encompasses events such as asset sell-offs, divesti-
tures, debt-rescheduling, employee layoffs and rights issues that may create positive wealth effects (Guedes 
& Parayre 1997), affecting credit-standing. By modeling the official stock exchange decisions to super-
vise/suspend or delist rather than the ultimate bankruptcy filings, we treat the former as “official” advance 
warnings for the latter. Although we do not examine in our study the effectiveness of stock exchange suspen-
sion announcements, they generally stem from the available facts and data, enhanced by press reports and 
anecdotal evidence (Bradley 1996). Assuming they do reflect severe FD corporate problems, they could be 
employed as proxies of a, by large, market consensus of severe difficulties. Under this formulation, the 
managerial-creditor tradeoff between bankruptcy and restructuring could be effectively proxied by a tradeoff 
between restructuring and impending stock supervision. 
We model Financial Distress (FD) as the condition of a firm being unable to cover Financial Expenses 
(FE) with its generated Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization adjusted 
(EBITDA) (Wruck, 1990) for two consecutive years. The setting of our model distinguishes restructuring 
cases, assumed a bullish investment signal (John et.al. 1992), from supervision, assumed a bearish one 
(Subrahmanyam, 1994); this presupposes that cases of stocks set under short term trading supervision or sus-
pension because of other than financial shortcomings reasons be excluded. Insofar restructuring announce-
ments command a stock exchange’s trading supervision or suspension we classify them under 
“restructuring”. A third option for FD companies may be to remain “idle”, without pursuing any of the two 
previous alternatives (a summary of our categorization can be seen in Fig. 1). 
This figure summarizes the categorization we employ for the alternative FD-related stock exchange de-
cisions that may affect a listed firm. The option to pursue bankruptcy or liquidation is almost always pre-
ceded by a stock exchange suspension. The decision to enter into a significant corporate restructuring may or 
may not ignite an official stock exchange action, although, in most cases, it does. Corporate inertia may fol-
low either a trading supervision/suspension/delisting or exchange’s inaction. 82 Konstantinos  Konstantaras 
 
Figure 1. Categorization of Financial Distress outcomes with respect to stock exchange enactments 
Our overall goal to predict restructuring versus supervision needs adequate explanatory variables that 
manage to discriminate between the three potential outcomes. We employ alternative ordinal logit model 
specifications, the most conclusive consisting of discrete probability mass-points of random unobserved het-
erogeneity and corresponding latent error classes (Greene 2008), alleviating inconsistency-generating nor-
mality assumptions for random error. We test whether the availability and attractiveness of our outcomes 
hinges on the severity of the FD condition, individual corporate characteristics, evidenced by selected finan-
cial ratios, and the overall macroeconomic conditions. We also test whether individual company characteris-
tics, possibly unobserved, may also affect the outcomes. Stepping one step ahead, we introduce covariates 
that may affect the probability of belonging to our estimated latent classes, accounting for crucial corporate 
characteristics that may drive ex ante the firm towards one or another latent class.  
Our sample of FD nonfinancial listed companies on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) from 1998-2004 
confirms our hypotheses and the validity of our modeling approach. As for specific covariates, we find that 
the probability of getting supervised/suspended/delisted increases for firms in severe FD, portraying lower 
performance than their peers and of lower size. A sequence of distressful macroeconomic performances and a 
self-destructing increased fixed asset investment may equally drive firms towards the same end. Larger firms 
exhibiting higher growth, more intense asset restructuring activity and higher managerial inefficiency (evi-
denced by a negative retained earnings history) show increased probability of getting restructured. 
The rest of our study is composed of the following parts: Second Part summarizes the definition of our 
problem alongside with pertinent literature and our hypotheses, Third Part depicts our econometric specifica-
tion which allows us to test our hypotheses, outlines our data and variables used, our Fourth Part presents our 
results and our comments and finally the Fifth Part sums up with our conclusions and suggestions for further 
research. 
2.  Problem definition, Literature review and hypotheses 
Within international literature different definitions of FD exist. The situation of a company’s inability to gen-
erate sufficient EBITDA to cover current Financial Expenses (Wruck 1990), used in our study is not a legally 
defined situation of FD such as bankruptcy or payment defaults, but a financial one. It has the benefits of de-
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a) On the one hand precedes, in the majority of cases, one or even more time-steps, the official filing for 
bankruptcy procedure or any restructuring attempts and  
b) On the other, amasses a much larger sample of companies that experience it without an eventual filing for 
bankruptcy, ending in alternative situations such as getting acquired by another entity or internally reor-
ganized.  
Moreover, in our sample we screen firms that meet the aforementioned criterion for two consecutive 
years, following the Jorstarndt and Sautner’s (2008) approach, rendering less likely a classification of a not 
FD firm in FD. 
Taking into consideration the fact that a company’s debt-driven failure will most probably render its 
listed equity valueless, stock exchange authorities are carefully scrutinizing corporations in FD. As a matter 
of fact, trading suspensions, stock supervision and trading disruptions are more common in shares of firms 
under FD as approximately half of delistings in major exchanges have their roots in FD (Dahiya & Klapper 
2007). A shorter or longer-term -depending on the nationality of the stock exchange- trading suspension may 
be the selected approach by exchange authorities (Engelen & Kabir 2006) compelling firms to disclose new 
pertinent information to the market.  
According to existing Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) regulations (ASE, 2008) FD driven stock supervi-
sion may be decided based on a) negative equity, b) losses exceeding 30% of its equity, without having offi-
cially announced a rights issue, c) exhibiting severe short-term debt overhang, d) official filling for 
bankruptcy protection (Articles 44, 45, 46 of Law 1982/1990) or e) facts or announcements casting serious 
doubts on whether it can continue to relentlessly operate. More severe measures available at ASE’s and 
Greek Capital Markets Committee’s hands, according to Article 17 of Law 3371/2005, include the decision 
to temporarily suspend trading or to delist company’s shares. We categorize explicit FD-driven cases of ex-
change authorities’ trading supervision/suspension/delisting for the above reasons under one roof, notwith-
standing that there may be numerous unrelated or implicitly related to FD, such as diminishing daily traded 
volume and mounting volatility. 
From the investor’s point of view, stock supervision on the ASE means disrupted and infrequent (thrice 
per day) auction-based trading, coupled with closer scrutinizing of company’s economic performance by the 
regulatory authorities. As a result of interrupted stock trading, negative implications are expected for the 
stock price or at least an augmentation of its risk (Subrahmanyam, 1994). Analogous detrimental return im-
plications have been evidenced in the case of NASDAQ delistings to the Pink Sheet market category on 
OTCBB (Macey 2008). From the point of view of its lenders, setting the stock under supervision or, even 
worse, suspension creates numerous problems in terms of its creditworthness along two directions: 1) should 
it bear a negative share price performance impact, it further depresses its market capitalization, reducing 
manager-owner willingness to continue struggling to cover the firm’s debt burden and 2) it raises the risk of 
outstanding stock collateral becoming entirely illiquid. Assuming financial institutions may already have ad-
vance FD warnings at their disposal, the most profound impact of setting a company’s stock under supervi-
sion/suspension/delisting may be on lending against to-be-supervised company’s shares. Stockbrokerage 
banking subsidiaries may also finance margin loans. Among the 27 developed countries surveyed by Endo, 
Rhee (2006), margin trading has been reportedly practiced in Greece (since 2001), Czech Republic (since 
1808), Hungary (since 1990, regulated since 1996) South Korea and Kuwait.  
Notwithstanding the fact that announcements of events such as mergers, acquisitions or any other sig-
nificant restructuring attempts give rise to a, mostly short term, trading halt, they gain entirely different eco-
nomic importance, promising a turnaround eventuality. Managerial, operational, asset and financial 
restructuring are the broad categories of strategies a FD firm may assume, the most common reportedly 
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being (John et. al. 1992) ‘contraction’ policies. Following this, we augment M&A events to encompass other 
restructuring forms by means of a) significant (>10% of book equity) divestitures, asset sales, spinoffs or 
plant shutdowns, b) substantial employee layoffs (>5% of workforce), c) successful raising funds in capital 
markets and d) private debt reschedulings. 
2.1. Pecking order between alternatives 
FD may be a reason to overcome managerial inertia and force it to modify its existing policies. On one hand, 
neither following a restructuring strategy nor experiencing a financial-shortcomings-driven trading supervi-
sion/suspension/delisting identifies our doing nothing category, which implies an underlying incentive to be 
relatively inactive. It reflects a situation in which a FD firm might either stay inert, undertake “softer” meas-
ures than those falling within our restructuring classification or escape trading supervision/ suspension/ de-
listing. The way we have defined restructuring outcomes, replacement of top management and dividend 
reductions/omissions have been omitted as counter-FD measures, although they are commonly undertaken in 
practice; implicitly we encompass such reactions within our nothing done category, appreciating that in our 
sample of Greek listed firms: (i) major shareholders are also the CEOs and (ii) the vast majority of the FD 
companies studied have had historically zero or very low dividend payout policy.  
A reason for pursuing “idleness” may be the inability or unwillingness to undertake any of our identified 
as restructuring measures, because of the illiquidity of its assets (Hotchkiss et. al. 2008) or the agency con-
flicts of managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theorists (Jensen, 1986) might purport to proclaim 
that management’s self-fulfillment would be their top priority, leading them choosing nothing as their princi-
ple choice, alleviating possible power shifts via either restructuring or supervision. An interest divergence 
between shareholders and managers may alleviate personal utility-reducing strategies (of managers) such as 
mergers, sell offs, layoffs and divestitures. At the same time, managers may be either unwilling, because of 
significant equity holdings, or unable, because of lenders’ monitoring efforts, to pursue high risk projects 
which might render the FD firm vulnerable to bankruptcy and closer to our supervision/ suspension/ delisting 
classification.  
On the other hand, for situations where company reorganization value is sufficiently large, equity hold-
ers’ and creditors’ incentives are to avoid bankruptcy, which could wipe out their shareholdings; alongside, 
management may assume an agent role for equity holders, through their self-interest in the preservation of 
their own jobs, actively taking up a non-liquidation (i.e. supervision/suspension/delisting) outcome. Should 
that be right, managers would be acting synergistically in a profit-maximizing rational “homo economicus” 
pursuit. Assuming this supposition right, we should expect supervision/suspension/delisting to be the last 
choice in management’s pecking order because of its adverse impact on its share value.  
Pecking order theorists (Myers & Mijluf, 1984) might be inclined to believe that because management 
prefers internal to external funds, the restructuring option might not be their number one priority, because of 
its dependence on external financing. Contrasting restructuring vs. supervision/suspension/delisting, we 
should most probably expect manager-owners to prefer the former, especially when indications that the 
going-concern value of the firm (minus restructuring costs) would exceed its liquidation value (future profit-
ability), or that levels of liquidity will be high enough to pay off unsecured creditors.  
Finally, it is worth noting that should any outcome order be prevalent, our hypothesis that management 
has a role to play in stock exchange trading decisions to suspend or delist trading would be then confirmed. 
On the other hand, indifference between outcomes of FD would ratify that the decision is entirely exogenous 
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2.2. Explanatory variables 
Our formulation employs financial ratios and economic variables that add incremental information to the al-
ready existing situation of FD. It’s worth mentioning that our incorporating M&A with other forms of inter-
nal corporate actions in restructuring may render typical predictors of M&A probability insignificant, such as 
higher Return on Assets or leverage, because of the conflicting economic drivers: contrast e.g. rights issues 
and asset sell-offs (divestitures) difficulty to implement during FD to the additional incentive for potential 
acquirers to buy out a firm during its recession business-cycle.  
Studies undertaken to uncover the economic drivers of trading supervisions and suspensions at Honk 
Kong’s stock exchange (Tai & Tai, 1986) reveal lower performance as an influential factor. Better corporate 
performance has been identified to bear an increased likelihood of an internal Turnaround (Baker & Ken-
nedy, 2002) and the chances of getting acquired (Dahiya & Klapper 2007). Along the same lines, FD compa-
nies of lower performance and size reportedly exhibit higher propensity of bankruptcy versus getting 
acquired (Dahiya & Klapper 2007, Baker & Kennedy 2002). Furthermore, Köke (2001) reports that ongoing 
restructuring activity, measured by the rate of fixed asset reduction, is significantly higher in German firms 
that are driven to bankruptcy in comparison to surviving ones, both categories depicting higher rates. An al-
ternative measure of corporate performance to return on assets (EBITDA over total assets) is also the rate of 
total asset growth as a measure of reduced risk resulting from increased investment and overall business ac-
tivity (Cooper et. al., 2008). 
The severity of FD has been mentioned as a positively driving factor of increased probability of bank-
ruptcy versus restructuring; we measure it by means of an indicator variable for two consecutive periods of 
our definition of FD, i.e. three consecutive years of EBITDA vs. Financial Expenses shortfall.  
Company characteristics such as higher size has been reportedly a positive indicator of i)the likelihood 
of a forthcoming acquisition (Dahiya & Klapper, 2007) and ii) the chances of getting either acquired or in-
ternally restructured (Köke, 2001). Another corporate characteristic, Fixed Asset Intensity (FAI), i.e. the per-
centage of tangible fixed assets in their total asset structure, has been reportedly positively associated with an 
increased probability of restructuring, asset sales, and becoming acquired (Baker & Kennedy, 2002), as there 
is an increased collateral value and, hence, financing potential. 
Managerial inefficiency is expected to positively influence the probability a FD firm assumes a subop-
timal decisional route; it may also contribute to either corporate failure or a potential acquisition by a more 
efficient predator (Theodossiou et al., 1996). Baker and Kennedy (2002) have reportedly spotted it as a factor 
leading to both distressed delistings and takeovers. A way to measure this is via poor historical performance, 
evidenced by lower retained earnings.  
A macroeconomic evidence of stimulus undertaken to curb economic downturn is interest rate reduc-
tion; as such, it is expected to positively influence the probability of FD driven stock Supervision. An even 
more severe downturn, reflected by two consecutive years of interest rate decline, should further indicate in-
creased likelihood of  supervision/suspension/delisting versus restructuring. On the contrary, interest rate 
hikes, portraying evidence of attempts to curb inflation and economic growth’s inflationary impact, are ex-
pected to positively influence restructuring. 
Another potentially influential factor may be the particular stock exchange’s rules concerning supervi-
sion or suspension as well as the institutionalized framework for M&A. ASE identifies companies with nega-
tive equity or significant losses relative to book equity as supervision/suspension/delisting candidates. 
Summing up, we employ covariates which portray a) the severity of FD situation, b) firm’s financial per-
formance, c) individual firm characteristics (size, fixed asset intensity), d) managerial inefficiency e) the overall 
economic condition and f) local stock exchange rules (covariates used are fully described underneath Table 1).  86 Konstantinos  Konstantaras 
Table 1. Expected covariates’ influence on OUTCOMES: 
Likelihood Ratio Test:  Supervision/Suspension/Delisting Corporate  Restructuring  Covariate/ 
Outcome  LR(chi2)  Prob>Chi2  Expected Sign  Hypothesis  Expectedsign Hypothesis 
Lagged_FD 6.66  0.010 +  S1  9  – R2  9 
Report_FD 9.78  0.002  +  S1  9  – R2  9 
Restruct_AI 8.92  0.003 +  S1  ¯   + R1  9 
Reli_assgrow 7.08  0.008  – S2  9  + R2  9 
RoA 2.31  0.129  –  S2  ¯  + R2  ¯ 
Size 3.56  0.059  –  S3  9  + R3  9 
FAI 1.63  0.201  –  S3  ¯  + R3  ¯ 
RetEarn 10.22  0.006  –  S4  ¯  – R4  9 
Intdif 21.55  0.000  –  S5  9  + R5  ¯ 
Lintdif 16.74  0.000  –  S5  9  + R5  ¯ 
9Indicates hypothesis has been confirmed, ¯ not confirmed. Likelihood ratio tests have been performed comparing the full covariates model 
with one lacking the variable tested. 
Covariates include Lagged_FD, which is a one-period lagged value of the indicator variable for FD (=1 
if for two consecutive years EBITDA is less than Financial Expenses), Report_FD assuming value of one 
should EBITDA plus extraordinary income be less than Financial Expenses, Restruct_AI which represents 
the industry-adjusted growth rate of company’s fixed assets, Reli_assgrow representing industry adjusted 
growth of total assets, RoA standing for EBITDA divided by total assets, Size proxied by the logarithm of 
total asset replacement value, FAI standing for industry-adjusted fixed assets as a percentage of total assets 
(following Pearce, Robbins (1993) findings we adjust it relative to individual industrial sectors of our FD 
universe), RetEarn representing retained earnings scaled by its replacement cost of total assets, Intdif for the 
rate of benchmark interest rate growth between current and previous years and Lintdif which is Intdif’s one 
period lagged value. The replacement cost of total assets has been estimated according to the Perfect and 
Wiles (1994) proposal as follows: 
Replacement cost of Total Assets:    it = RFit + (TAit – BFit) 
RFit is the replacement cost of Fixed Assets, TAit is Total Assets variable and BFit the total remaining 
book value of fixed assets, as portrayed on the Balance Sheet. The Replacement Cost of total Assets is calcu-
lated according to Perfect and Wiles (1994): 
RFit = RFit-1[(1 +  t)/(1 +  it)] + Iit 
For t > t0, whereas for the first year of observations we assume RFit0 = BFit0, t0 standing for the first ob-
servations’ year.  it equals to Dit/BFit, with Dit the annual Depreciation expense and  t = (GCGPt – GCGPt-1)/
GCGPt-1 with GCGP the Growth of Capital Goods Price Index as reported by the Greek National Statistics 
Service. 
The severity of FD is accounted for by modeling its temporal persistence and the degree to which ex-
traordinary revenue has succeeded in covering financial expenses. Relative financial performance and mana-
gerial inefficiency measured by the rate of total assets growth, return on assets and scaled retained earnings 
are also accounted for. Individual company characteristics such as total asset size and fixed asset intensity are 
also included. We also incorporate the degree macroeconomic environment affects the overall outcome by 
including recent interest rate adjustments. Lastly, Athens Stock Exchange’s rules for supervision/ suspension/ 
delisting (ASE, 2008) are taken into account through the level of retained earnings.  
2.2.1  Hypotheses regarding the probability of supervision/suspension/delisting vs. nothing  
Our Hypotheses with respect to the probability of supervision/suspension/delisting versus doing nothing are 
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S1: The more severe the situation of FD, as reflected by a) lagged FD indicator variable, b) an indicator 
variable of Reported FD reflecting situations in which firms in FD have not managed, even after having ac-
counted for extraordinary income generated to cover their FE and c) a higher Industry-Adjusted Restructur-
ing Activity Intensity (RAI), evidenced from mounting fixed asset sales, the higher the probability a FD 
company’s stock will be set under supervision/ suspension/ delisting. 
S2: A lower than average FD firm’s performance, evidenced by a) lower adjusted RoA or b) negative To-
tal Asset growth, the higher the probability a FD company’s stock will be set under supervi-
sion/suspension/delisting. 
S3: The lower the size and Fixed Asset Intensity of a company, measured respectively by a) the natural 
logarithm of the replacement value of its Total Assets and b) the percentage of tangible fixed assets in total 
assets, the higher the probability a FD company’s stock will be set under supervision/ suspension/ de-
listing. 
S4: The higher the managerial inefficiency and firm’s accumulated losses, measured by scaled Retained 
Earnings, which may bring closer the stock exchange’s decision for supervision/suspension/delisting, the 
higher the probability a FD company’s stock will be set under supervision/suspension/delisting.  
S5: The more interest rates have been declining during a) the preceding accounting period and b) the one 
before it, the higher the probability a FD company’s stock will be set under supervision/suspension/
delisting.  
2.2.2  Hypotheses regarding the probability of Restructuring versus doing nothing 
Our Hypotheses with respect to the probability of restructuring versus doing nothing are summarized as fol-
lows: 
R1. The higher the undergoing Restructuring Activity –reflected by greater fixed asset reduction, the 
higher the probability a FD company will undertake corporate restructuring. 
R2. The less severe the FD in terms of a lower a) reported FD indicator, b) lagged FD indicator and the 
better its financial performance, measured by c) Return on Total Assets, or d) total assets growth rate, the 
higher the probability a FD company will undertake corporate restructuring.  
R3. The higher its asset collateral value, measured by a) its total assets size and b) its fixed asset intensity, 
the higher the probability a FD company will undertake corporate restructuring. 
R4. The higher the managerial inefficiency and firm’s accumulated losses, indicated by lower scaled Re-
tained Earnings, the higher the probability a FD company will undertake corporate restructuring. 
R5. The better the macroeconomic environment, as evidenced by ascending interest rates over a) the last 
year and the b) preceding, the higher the probability a FD company will undertake corporate restruc-
turing. 
Based on the above, our explanatory variables are expected to portray an influence on each of the estab-
lished outcomes as shown on Table 1. Our final results regarding significance of coefficients and hypotheses 
tested are also, alongside, depicted. 
2.2.3  Hypotheses regarding managerial pecking order for alternatives 
We expect a different order of outcome choices depending on each theoretical supposition for managerial 
incentives. By analyzing our sample we may test the following hypotheses: 
Po1 Assuming managers pursue their own hubris interests, independently of the rest of shareholders, we 
  expect them to prefer nothing done (remaining idle).  
Po2 Should  management actions adhere to Pecking order theory’s suppositions, they would avoid 
 restructuring more than any other choice. 
Po3 Managers pursuing shareholder interests select restructuring as their most preferred choice and 
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Bearing in mind that our sample consists of firms with increased managerial shareholdings, we expect 
profit maximization to portray a higher propensity rather than any other choices, confirming Po3. An indif-
ferent choice result nullifies our hypothesis that managerial decisions have a role to play on exchange man-
datory suspensions, alongside with their apparent role in voluntary ones.  
3.  Econometric modeling 
We follow an ordinal modeling outcome approach in order to incorporate managerial preferences of restruc-
turing over doing nothing over suffering a FD-driven supervision/suspension/delisting into our modeling 
framework. The econometric modeling approach we take estimates company’s alternatives in an ordinal 
mixed logit setting with random unobserved heterogeneity to account for unobserved individual company 
effects. Latent Class (LC) structuring of unobserved heterogeneity, outlined in Greene (2008), has only ap-
peared, to the best of our knowledge, in one related paper in predicting the takeover targets for FD corpora-
tions (Jones & Hensher, 2007), without a regression structure for latent class membership dependence on 
covariates. The parametric approach we take in estimating unobserved heterogeneity with a more flexible 
discrete latent class error distribution, differentiates our approach from previous studies, achieving a more 
consistent error distribution. Regressing the probability, at company level, of belonging to one or another LC 
provides us with a prior credit risk assessment tool to assess ex-ante counterparty credit risk. 
We have used the Generalized Linear and Latent Mixed Modeling framework (gllamm) software pack-
age in STATA (StataCorp LP, 4905 Lakeway Drive, College Station, TX 77845 USA stata@stata.com) as the 
basis of calculations (Rabe-Hesketh et. al., 2005). The basic concept behind this package is the use of a linear 
predictor which is the binomial mapping of the mean response –ordinal in our case– representing the mean 
utility associated with a particular outcome. Its basic assumption is a linear relation between the mean utility 
and the explanatory variables. It also offers the additional flexibility to model multilevel/hierarchical and 
mixed/random coefficient models, even with non-parametric discrete mass distributions for each of the ran-
dom effects at every single level. 
3.1. Models and assumptions 
The conditional probabilities of getting the company’s stock under supervision/ suspension/ delisting or hav-
ing the enterprise restructured or nothing of the previous happening, given FD, are the conditional probabili-
ties: 
 i)  Pr  [(restructuring)it | (FD)it] 
 ii) Pr  [(nothing)it | (FD)it] 
 iii)  Pr [(supervision/suspension/delisting)it | (FD)it] 
Schematically, our model is depicted in Appendix A. Assuming that management proceeds in an effort 
to maximize utility pertaining to each of the three available choices j preferring restructuring ( j = 1) to doing 
nothing ( j = 2) to supervision/suspension/delisting ( j = 3), there is a trinomial ordered choice setting. The 
utility function Uij or, to be more concise, Uitj to account for the temporal nature of the decisions, consists of 
an observable Vitj part and an unobservable error   itj: 
Uitj = Vitj +   itj 
The probability a firm’s management selects one of the three choices would then be: 
Prij = Pr(Uitj > Uitm); ∀ m ≠ j, m = 1, ..3. 
The basic ordinal logit model assumes that the cumulative log odds are specified as a linear function of 
its covariates Xi: 
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An easy way to understand how ordinal model formulation works is via the specification of an unob-
served latent variable Y
*, which may be assumed to reflect an underlying continuous scale of e.g. the propen-
sity to exit from FD in our case. The continuous latent variable Y
* is assumed to have several –as many as 
our distinct categories- threshold points. The value of the outcome Yi depends on whether or not individual 
propensity Y
* has crossed a particular threshold, usually referred to as cutpoints in empirical literature. For 
our three outcome framework there exist two (three minus one) cutpoints and this model then implies that: 
 Y i = 1 if Yi
* is ≤  1   
 Y i = 2 if  1 ≤ Yi
*≤  2   
 Y i = 3 id Yi
* ≥  2   
Or equivalently the cumulative probabilities: 





















In order to estimate individual probabilities, apart from P(Yi = 3) which is readily obtained from P
(Yi > 2), we must subtract individual outcome probabilities to calculate the rest: 
P(Yi = 1) = 1 – P(Yi > 1) and P(Yi = 2)= P(Yi > 1) – P(Yi > 2). 
In order to obtain a usable model we need to address the issue of the unobservable error’s distribution. 
Assuming that the errors are independent of explanatory variables and distributed iid Logistic with constant 
variance equal to 
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Assuming errors are distributed Gumbel type 1 (extreme value) with constant variance equal to
6
2 π we 
get the complementary ordinal log-logit model: 
F(  its) = exp(–exp(  its)) 
This basic model assumes that observed ordinal responses Yi for the same firm are conditionally inde-
pendent given the covariates Xi. It further assumes that beta coefficients are the same for each outcome j 
which is commonly referred as the ‘proportional odds’ assumption, namely that the effect of a variable is as-
sumed (actually constrained) to have a constant effect on the probability of Yi, a highly restrictive assump-
tion. 
The parallel slope (proportional odds) formulation may be relaxed by introducing random slopes  j to 
certain covariates in order to allow them to vary according to the categories of Yi. A fully unconstrained 
slopes model yields very similar results and fit to multinomial logit models, resembling to running a series of 
logistic regressions, firstly category 1 versus all others and secondly categories 1 and 2 versus all others. Re-
laxing this, we may assume a partially proportional odds model, whereas some but not all coefficients are the 
same across values of outcomes j. We would expect that such models are more parsimonious than their 
equivalent non-ordinal multinomial alternatives. Assuming there exist   coefficients, same for each alterna-
tive, and  j with varying slopes across firms, our model would be then formulated as: 
 Logit  {P(Yi > s | xi,  i,  ,  j)} =   i +  jxi –  s (2) 
By introducing random unobserved company heterogeneity we may in addition to (3) relax the restric-
tive absence of company effects in the previous model: 
 Logit  {Pr(yij > s |xijt,  sjt,  j,  ,  j)} =  jxijt +  i +    sjt –  s (3) 
Whereas, the overall intercept is  i and is varying over firms throughout our panel, but assumed inde-
pendent across firms and following a normal distribution  i |xijt ~ N(0,z).  90 Konstantinos  Konstantaras 
The model’s Log likelihood will be estimated as: 
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dijt denotes the indicator variable for the event yij = j. 
The fact that random effects may not be normally distributed supports our motivation for a Non-
Parametric Maximum Likelihood estimation which can relax the random error distributional assumption and 
estimate its form via a number of discrete probability mass-points. Based on this formulation, the unobserved 
company heterogeneity  i for company i consists of c = 1, …, C latent classes in M dimensions. Firms be-
longing to the same latent class share the same value-location of  i. Hence, the joint distribution of outcomes 
Yi for unit i is given by the multiple of the conditional density of the response given the observed and latent 
variables times the probability distribution of latent classes: 
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By increasing the number of classes until the likelihood cannot be further increased we get a nonpara-
metric maximum likelihood (NPML) estimator of the continuous random error distribution. Following the 
same NPML approach we may establish certain covariates oi which affect the prior probability that firm i is 












π where uc are parameters with u1=0 for identification.  (5) 
Along the same lines, we may assume that there exist random slopes across firms for specific covariates, 
discrete latent error classes but relax the logit error formulation, which might be applicable for symmetric 
and gradual changes in the cumulative probabilities but fail to account for asymmetric distributions as com-
plementary log-logistic can. We introduce the complementary log-logistic link as our data have higher cumu-
lative probability for lower scores and the approach towards probability of 1 is slow (Norusis, 2005). 
The complementary log-logistic link function is given by: 
 f( ) = ln(–ln(1 –  )  (6) 
Finally, we may introduce random coefficients for selected explanatory variables in order to better cap-
ture their stochastic nature. In addition to the random intercepts we may introduce random slopes  s
’:  
 Logit  {Pr(yij>s|xijt, j,  s
’)} =  jxijt +  i +  s
’ xsjt +    sjt –  s (7) 
In this model, apart from the intercept, slope  s
’ varies over companies. For identification purposes we 
assume that the random intercept and slope have a bivariate discrete class distribution with zero mean and 
symmetrical covariance matrix, and that both random intercepts and slopes are independent across firms. 
Marginal effects in ordinal models differ from coefficient signs. In order to obtain marginal effects of 
the continuous covariates we follow delta method (Greene, 2008). 
3.2. Sample characteristics 
Our sample consists of the complete universe of FD non-financial, not government-owned, non utility or in-
vestment companies listed and delisted from the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), with a listing history of at 
least three years between 1998 and 2004 included. For comparison purposes, we have excluded observations 
of companies which published annual reports at a period different than the year-end or for an accounting pe-
riod surpassing twelve months (typical during their IPO year). It is an unbalanced panel which has the format 
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Table 2. Frequency distribution of outcomes for FD FIRMS 
Year  Outcome 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Supervision  00  03  03  04  03 11 09  033 
Nothing 12  11  06 15 14 10 10 078 
Restructuring  03  05  06 4 10  07  09  044 
Total  15 19 15 23 27 28 28 155 
It contains both bull and bear years, e.g. the stock market bubble of the late 1990s, the decline between 
2000 and 2003 and the partial recovery during 2004. All accounting data have been extracted from the offi-
cial ASE database. Company data are based on Greek Accounting Standards. Beginning on 2005, the manda-
tory introduction of IFRS for listed companies has changed the comparison yardstick for previously 
published accounting data. Our data represent 155 observations from 59 companies in 20 industrial sectors, 
according to the ASE’s official industry classification.  
We use trading supervision/ suspension/ delisting and corporate event information published at the official 
Athens stock exchange website www.ase.gr, cross checked with individual company announcements at their offi-
cial websites, in the case of still existing firms, but also with web news providers, such as www.
euro2day.gr and www.naftemporiki.gr. We notice that our sample is scarce with Supervision events in 1998 and 
depicts increased frequency of supervision/suspension/delisting and restructuring events during the last two years, 
as an aftermath to the 2000-2002 market slump. The rules for supervision have been initiated in 1998, hence the 
lack of such events before 1998. Table 3 displays summary statistics for selected explanatory variables.  
Table 3. Selected summary statistics (mean/se mean) 
 Lagged_FD  Report_FD  Reli_asst.grow  Restruct_AI. RoA FAI  Size  Intdif Lintdif  RetEarn
supervision  .757 .848  .789  .976  –.0387  .566 .482 –.246  –.251  .699 
  .075 .063  .073  .092  .0131  .032  .025  .038  –.031 .029 
nothing  .602 .628 1.125  1.078  –.0270  .685  .587  –.181  –.195  .786 
  .056 .055  .242  .144  .007 .025 .022  .017  –.016 .008 
restructuring  .568 .432  .999  .892  –.0169  .655 .636 –.179  –.235  .760 
  .075 .075  .090  .036  .0061  .034  .025  .025  –.024 .020 
Total .626  .619  1.018  1.003  –.0267  .651  .578  –.195  –.218  .760 
 .039  .039  .125  .0759  .0050  .018  .015  .014  –.012 .009 
Means are shown on the top and standard errors of mean at the bottom.  
Variable definitions are provided at Table 1 above.  
Table 4. Comparison of means among outcomes 
  Supervision versus Nothing  Supervision versus Restructuring  Restructuring versus Nothing 
Lagged_FD  0.0365 (0.39)  0.106  (0.98) 0.069 (0.72) 
Report_FD 0.295**  (3.37)  0.394*** (4.12)  0.098  (1.00) 
Reli_asst.grow  –0.331 (–0.96) –0.186 (–1.63)  0.145  (0.41) 
Restruct_AI. –0.106  (–0.50) 0.126 (1.52) 0.232 (1.10) 
RoA –0.00535  (–0.40)  –0.0110  (–0.88)  –0.006  (–0.48) 
FAI –0.116**  (–2.84)  –0.0671  (–1.44)  0.049  (1.15) 
Size –0.0476  (–1.33)  –0.0815*  (–2.10)  –0.034  (–0.92) 
Intdif  0.0323 (0.93) 0.0212 (0.50) –0.011  (–0.36) 
Lintdif –0.171***  (–6.39)  –0.118**  (–3.08)  0.053*  (2.43) 
RetEarn –0.0474*  (–2.32)  –0.0165  (–0.50)  0.031  (1.43) 
N  115   83   114  
Results from t-tests comparing explanatory variable means between alternative outcomes; t-statistics in parentheses.  
Stars indicate p-values as follows: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
Variable definitions are provided at Table 1 above. 92 Konstantinos  Konstantaras 
4.  Results 
Estimation results for alternative model formulations are shown at Table 4. We start with a simple ordinal 
model (ORD_1) without random effects; next, to a selective non-parallel, no random effects (ORD_2) model; 
the following is a non-parallel with random effects (ORD_3); we proceed with a non-parallel discrete prob-
ability mass error distribution (ORD_4); the following uses size as a regressand of the prior probability of 
belong to each latent class (ORD_5); next, with complementary log-log error distribution (ORD_6) and fi-
nally with a stochastic coefficient (slope) for company size (ORD_7). 















Lagged_FD –0.695*  –0.689+  –0.783+  –0.929* –0.937*  –0.839**  –1.071** 
  (–1.974)  (–1.872) (–1.886) (–2.338) (–2.359) (–3.020)  (–2.632) 
Report_FD –1.119**  –1.255**  –1.478**  –1.083** –1.081** –0.783**  –1.127** 
  (–2.999)  (–3.201) (–3.166) (–2.609) (–2.615) (–2.770)  (–2.674) 
Reli_assgrow 0.731*  0.873*  1.028* 0.850* 0.854*  0.628**  1.706** 
 (2.171)  (2.370)  (2.436)  (2.116)  (2.119)  (3.104)  (3.254) 
Restruct_AI –1.337*  –1.599**  –1.925**  –1.654* –1.665*  –1.164***  –3.046*** 
  (–2.431)  (–2.632) (–2.698) (–2.438) (–2.442) (–3.297)  (–3.464) 
RoA –0.805  –0.191  0.185  2.119  1.916  –0.037  3.717 
 (–0.288)  (–0.059)  (0.050)  (0.467) (0.415)  (–0.013)  (0.863) 
FAI  0.321  0.239 0.304 0.260 0.277 0.531  0.484 
  (0.366)  (0.259) (0.268) (0.261) (0.279) (0.814)  (0.475) 
Size 2.367*  2.507*  2.402  1.727  1.629  1.263  –24.480* 
  (2.091)  (2.099) (1.614) (1.360) (1.290) (1.418)  (–2.253) 
Intdif  2.818*         
  (2.471)         
RetEarn  0.247         
  (0.132)         
Lintdif  1.174         
  (0.910)         
_cutpoint  11           
Intdif    –5.629*** –6.198*** –9.040*** –9.140*** –4.835***  –9.536*** 
    (–3.710) (–3.477) (–3.795) (–3.872) (–3.947)  (–3.807) 
RetEarn    –3.422+  –3.297 –3.491 –3.547 –1.767  –2.252 
    (–1.890) (–1.549) (–1.381) (–1.387) (–1.306)  (–0.779) 
Lintdif   –4.890**  –5.198*  –9.401** –9.644** –4.648**  –10.139** 
    (–2.606) (–2.379) (–2.999) (–3.137) (–3.208)  (–3.109) 
_cons –2.285  –1.677  –2.634  –4.355*  –0.567  –0.544  –11.689** 
  (–1.410)  (–1.071) (–1.289) (–1.985) (–0.194) (–0.334)  (–3.167) 
_cutpoint  12           
Intdif   –0.756  –0.755  –0.966 –0.940 –0.567  –0.687 
    (–0.535) (–0.483) (–0.677) (–0.658) (–0.475)  (–0.479) 
RetEarn   2.879  3.761+  4.076+  4.020+  3.042*  5.276* 
    (1.604) (1.690) (1.838) (1.803) (2.170)  (1.984) CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS' ROLE IN MANDATORY VERSUS VOLUNTARY FINANCIAL DISTRESS DRIVEN TRADING SUS-PENSIONS 93 















Lintdif    1.456 1.781 1.200 1.194 1.310  1.598 
    (0.923) (0.984) (0.755) (0.752) (1.044)  (0.989) 
_cons 0.427  –1.195  –2.071  –2.511  1.373  0.318  –9.191** 
  (0.265)  (–0.758) (–1.023) (–1.303) (0.473)  (0.186)  (–2.751) 
Unobs.     0.926*         
Heterog.     (2.215)         
Masspoint 1        –5.331***  –1.604  –1.408  0.378 
       (–3.528)  (–0.789)  (–1.179)  (0.567) 
Probability 1        –2.444*** 0.998  0.235  2.437 
       (–4.599)  (0.589)  (0.163)  (1.340) 
Masspoint  2          –2.215 
(Size)          (–0.585) 
Probability  2        –6.697+  –4.275  –9.019* 
(Size)        (–1.843)  (–1.542)  (–2.307) 
N  155  155 155 155 155 155  155 
ll  –141.03  –130.46 –129.35 –125.37 –123.23 –124.15  –120.52 
aic  306.06 290.92  290.69  284.74 282.45 284.30  279.03 
bic  342.58 336.57  339.39  336.47 337.24 339.08  336.86 
Prob>chi2 =  0.0000  
(w.r.t. const) 
0.0001 0.1356 0.0048 0.0385  (–)  0.0199   
(w.r.t. no rand. slope) 
***,**,*,+ indicate significance at the 0.001,0.01,0.05,0.10 levels respectively. t-statisic in parenthesis. N indicates number of observations under 
each alternative outcome, ll is each model’s maximum likelihood at convergence and aic and bic represent Akaike’s and Baye’s criteria. 
Prob>chi2 indicates Likelihood ratio tests performed between successive nested models from left to right. The first test compares full covariates 
to constant-only model and the last to a model with no random slope. 
Ordinal regression seems to offer a better data fit than its multinomial equivalent, as evidenced by the 
improvement of Akaike’s Information scoring Criterion between parallel and non parallel slopes (ORD_1 vs. 
ORD_2). Noteworthy is our estimated unobserved company effect, consisting of only two probability mass-
points, rendering normality a rather restrictive assumption (Figure 2). These two mass-points may be as-
sumed to represent latent classes of firms depicting alternative propensity to exit FD, as can be shown at their 
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Figure 2. Location of estimated random effects latent class mass-points 94 Konstantinos  Konstantaras 
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Figure 3. Boxplots of companies represented by each latent class 
Furthermore, as seen from our results from model specification (ORD_5), size influences the probability 
of belonging to one or another of the estimated latent classes. Our results show that the lower the size the 
higher the ex ante probability of belonging to the class with increased likelihood of supervision/suspension/
delisting. Furthermore, removing size as a latent class membership regressand and introducing it as a sto-
chastic slope, we get an improvement in the overall likelihood and better model fit by the AIC and BIC crite-
ria. Moreover, estimating classification tables for prediction of the outcomes, we find that classification 
accuracy is by far better than by chance (results available upon request from the authors). 
Finally, for reasons of completeness, we have also estimated models allowing for industry clustering (3 
level clustering, results not shown) and explored other covariates for random coefficients, but have not iden-
tified any particular formulation significantly better than those we have described above. 
4.1. Explanatory variables/Hypotheses/Average Partial effects 
Summing up our findings, Return on Assets and Fixed Asset Intensity are not statistically significant in any 
of our specifications. Size, as a mean effect, is significant in both our no-random effects as well as in our fi-
nal random size coefficient model. Interest differential, its lagged value and scaled Retained Earnings are 
significant in most of our random effects specifications.  
By averaging partial effects (APE) over our estimation sample (assuming zero random effects) we may 
estimate the average directional influence of each statistically significant covariate. The summary of our 
findings with respect to influences of each covariate are summarized at Table 1, as well as which of our hy-
potheses have been confirmed. Severity of FD, portrayed by lagged FD and RFD indicator variables, as ex-
pected in hypotheses S1  and R1, bears an inverse impact on the probability of supervision/suspension/
delisting vs. restructuring (positive vs. negative). Corporate performance positively influences the probability 
of restructuring, and inversely the probability supervision/suspension/delisting, confirming hypotheses S2 
and R2. 
Restructuring Intensity (rate of fixed asset reduction), significant throughout our specifications, posi-
tively affects the probability of restructuring (negative fixed asset growth coefficient) confirming our R1 hy-
pothesis. Although its impact on the probability of supervision has been also expected negative, it is positive, 
indicating that companies in supervision/suspension/delisting instead of enacting fixed asset reductions to 
generate income have rather increased their tangible asset investments, failing to endorse our S1 hypothesis. 
Notwithstanding that supervision/suspension/delisting is not the same situation as bankruptcy, which has 
been previously found dependent on restructuring intensity, there may be two plausible explanations for our 
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result: i) either managerial overconfidence (Khaneman et. al., 1982) leads them to underestimate the situation 
and pursue self-destructing policies, which because of the severity of the circumstances they are facing af-
fects them to a greater extent than companies doing nothing, resulting to their setting under supervision or ii) 
the announcement of fixed asset investment in periods of FD signals to the investor community a positive 
misperception which promotes stock market performance exploiting “signal jamming” (Bizjak et al., 1993). 
Further to Bizjak et al., (1993), this behavior is more probable to take place whenever managers place more 
emphasis on current stock price relative to future profits and future stock price, a situation that characterizes 
FD.  
Size negatively affects the probability for supervision/suspension/delisting and positively restructuring, 
indicating that smaller firms tend to get more often under supervision, whereas larger companies usually re-
structure, confirming our hypotheses S3 and R3. Moreover, size is an influential factor for determining the 
ex-ante membership of the estimated latent error classes (see discussion below).  
Scaled Retained Earnings has a statistically significant negative effect, indicating an increased probabil-
ity of restructuring due to chronic management inefficiency problems, ratifying our R4 hypothesis.  
On the macroeconomic front, year on year interest rate differential and its lagged value influence the 
probability of getting a FD company under supervision/suspension/delisting. Its APE direction is in line with 
our anticipated hypotheses, indicating that the deeper the macroeconomic difficulties, evidenced by sequen-
tial YOY interest rate reductions, the higher the difficulties listed companies in FD face, hence the greater the 
probability of having their shares under supervision or suspension. The same APE directional impact also 
holds for interest rate differential’s lagged value, confirming our S5 hypothesis. 
Table 5. Results for managerial pecking order 
 ‘Synergistic’  Po3 ‘Agency  conflict’  Po1 ‘Pecking  order’  Po2 
Dependent  Order of 
outcomes:   N  Order of 
outcomes:  N  Order of 
outcomes:  N 
supervision  33 nothing  78 restructuring  44 
nothing  78 restructuring  44 supervision  33 
 
restructuring  44 supervision  33 nothing  78 
N  155 155 155 
ll  –122.973 –136.672 –139.405 
aic  281.946 309.345 312.811 
bic  336.728 364.126 364.549 
N indicates number of observations under each alternative outcome, ll is each model’s maximum 
likelihood at convergence and aic and bic represent Akaike’s and Baye’s informational criteria for 
evaluating each particular selection order.  
Finally, we estimate three alternative dependent variable rankings (Table 5), run with our best fitting 
model specification. Comparing the models, the most likely choice managers made is Restructuring, Super-
vision being the least wanted, as evidenced by the significant difference in AIC, BIC and log likelihood 
scores. This result confirms our hypothesis Po3, indicating that they act rationally with profit maximization 
and company’s valuation as their premier goal. Bearing in mind that in the majority of the market they repre-
sent manager-owners, our finding is congruent with the synergistic theoretical supposition. Moreover, it vali-
dates our modeling, justifying that management plays, at least an implicit, role in stock decision to supervise 
or suspend trading of shares; the existence of an apparent ordering among alternatives implies that some 
stock exchange decisions are more preferred by the average FD company than others, hence influence the 
way management takes strategic decisions. 96 Konstantinos  Konstantaras 
5.  Conclusions 
We have estimated the probability for FD firms to enter stock exchange’s supervision/ suspension/ delisting 
or have their company restructured. Having set up several theoretical hypotheses regarding the influence of 
individual financial ratios, indicators and macroeconomic variables we have tested them on a sample of listed 
industrial and services companies on the ASE. We have found that our models adequately describe the cases 
of listed companies on the ASE between 1998 and 2004 taken under stock exchange’s supervision/ suspen-
sion/ delisting as well as those which pursued corporate restructuring (asset or liability). Moreover, our 
model depicts that different economic reasons drive management to opt for restructuring versus supervision/ 
suspension/ delisting. We also reject the hypothesis that stock exchange’s decisions to suspend company 
shares, involuntarily or not, are taken exogenously to the firm and confirm that management does play an 
interactive role with the authorities.  
Pursuing an ordinal logit econometric modeling we find that our distinction between the cases of super-
vision/ suspension/ delisting and restructuring is successful. Employing a latent class construction of random 
unobserved heterogeneity we find it is constituted with only two probability mass-points, showing apparent 
non-normality. Based on Akaike’s AIC and Bayesian Information scoring Criterion, the best formulation 
consists of a non-parametric error with company size as regressand for ex ante class membership and a ran-
dom size coefficient. Concluding, we show that our sample, consisting of a majority of manager-owned 
firms, decisions taken in times of FD are principally determined by synergistic criteria (value maximization). 
We find strong evidence that the probability of assuming a restructuring option depends upon financial 
ratios that positively relate to lower retained earnings (denoting managerial inefficiency), better performance, 
intense restructuring, higher size and a less severe FD. The probability of getting a company’s stock under 
supervision/ suspension/ delisting depends on the gravity and state dependence of its FD condition, lower 
size, worse corporate performance and increased tangible asset investments, a controversial element. The lat-
ter might be explained by either managerial overconfidence or a managerial effort to signal jam (Bizjak et 
al., 1993). 
Our methodology is a helpful tool for regulators or bankers wishing to assist or better supervise specific 
industrial segments in FD, as we provide tools to effectively monitor and understand the situation. The in-
corporation of additional stock market data for FD companies’ shares to estimate their influence on manage-
rial decisions and exchange authorities’ rulings is left for future researchers.  
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